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Abstract One of the most important developments in the world economy during
the past three decades has been the willingness of governments in emerging markets
to liberalize controls over international capital movements—a process known as cap-
ital account liberalization+What accounts for this trend? While existing research high-
lights a number of important factors, it neglects the role played by the rise and spread
of neoliberal ideas that prioritized liberalization as a policy choice+ Extending the
literature on epistemic communities, I argue one critical mechanism shaping policy
decisions is the formation of a coherent team of neoliberal economists+ Using a new
data set that codes the professional training of more than 1500 policymakers in emerg-
ing markets, I assess the relative importance of this argument quantitatively on a
sample of twenty-nine emerging markets from 1977 to 1999+ In order to assess the
independent effect of neoliberal economists, I also take into account the endogeneity
of the appointment process, assessing whether appointments are driven by credibility
concerns, political interests, or economic conditions+ I also stress that a fuller under-
standing of the appointment process necessitates a focus on the social environment
in which appointments are situated+
One of the most important developments in the world economy during the past
three decades has been the willingness of governments in emerging markets to
open up their economies to global markets+ A significant element of this opening
has been the liberalization of capital controls—a process known as capital account
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liberalization+ What accounts for this trend? One view claims that capital controls
no longer “work” in the context of capital mobility, thus obliging states to liber-
alize+1 Another view points to the role of interest groups+2 Although they make
important contributions, these arguments cannot fully account for this trend+
Despite rising capital mobility, there has been considerable policy variation across
emerging markets+While some states, such as Argentina in the 1990s or Indonesia
in the 1970s, liberalized, other states, such as Argentina in the 1980s or Chile and
Malaysia in the 1990s, relied on capital controls+ Evidence from the Chilean and
Malaysian cases also indicates that these controls were in some respects quite effec-
tive+3 Rather than serving as an inescapable constraint, capital mobility alone
appears indeterminate in shaping policy decisions+ What this view overlooks is
that capital mobility—as with all material trends—must be socially mediated and
interpreted by policymakers+4
Interest group pressures are also not always decisive+ Considerable uncertainty
and imperfect information surround the decision to liberalize the capital account,
particularly in emerging markets+ For instance, domestic financial intermediaries
in emerging markets are often uncertain as to whether they stand to benefit from
the increased opportunities for intermediation that can accompany liberalization
or whether they stand to be harmed from the possibility that liberalization will
precipitate a banking crisis due to the legacies of financial repression and poor
prudential supervision that typically characterize emerging markets+
This uncertainty often leads interest groups to fall silent when one might expect
them to be critical players+ This silence is born out in several cross-national com-
parative studies of policy reform+5 In their study of policy reform in eight emerg-
ing markets, Bates and Krueger find that “in such situations, advocates of particular
economic theories or ideological conceptions of how economies work can acquire
influence @and shape policy#+” 6
A key task then is to understand which “particular economic theories or ideo-
logical conceptions” were critical for capital account liberalization and how their
advocates acquired influence+ Existing explanations, however, offer little insight
and generally neglect the role of these ideas and their advocates+7 Drawing on the
literature on epistemic communities,8 I focus on the influence of economists pro-
moting neoliberal ideas prescribing liberalization+A variety of factors, such as uncer-
tainty, credibility concerns, or political interests, often lead politicians to appoint
economists as policymakers+ Prior and after their appointment, these economists
1+ Andrews 1994+
2+ Frieden 1991+
3+ See the summary provided in IMF 2005, 18, 46, 75–76+
4+ See Blyth 2002; and Widmaier 2003+
5+ See Bates and Krueger 1993, 454–56; and Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 36+
6+ Bates and Krueger 1993, 456+
7+ Eichengreen 2001, 351+
8+ Haas 1992+
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advocate via negotiation and persuasion a set of causal and normative beliefs about
how the economy operates and how it should be organized+ These causal and nor-
mative beliefs are in turn shaped via a process of socialization that often occurs in
the context of professional training in economics+
To implement their preference into policy, these economists must persuade and
negotiate with other policymakers and politicians+ Even if an economist becomes
chief of government he or she still must often confront various political con-
straints, such as a coalition government, legislative pressures, or opposing interest
groups+ Yet the epistemic community literature leaves unclear the conditions that
facilitate the implementation of ideas into policy+ Here I build on this line of
research by focusing on how the formation of a coherent policymaking team mat-
ters+ By producing nearly consistent advice from policymakers and enhancing their
autonomy from interest groups, coherence increases the likelihood that neoliberal
economists can implement their shared ideas into policy+ When these economists
form a coherent policymaking team, capital account policy is more likely to be
liberalized+
This article also advances ideational research methodology+ There is now a large
number of studies on ideas, economists, and their role in shaping economic pol-
icy+Yet despite the considerable number of case studies, there have been few efforts
to assess the relative importance of ideas and economists on policymaking+ More
significantly, these studies generally fail to address seriously the issue that appoint-
ment strategies of politicians are endogenous, let alone attempt to test it+ These
studies are therefore unable to fully assess the independent effect of ideas and
economists+ Thus, not only are rigorous tests of ideas and economists generally
lacking, but there is also inadequate attention to the problem of endogeneity+
By contrast, this article examines these issues in a systematic and rigorous man-
ner+ Employing a new data set that codes the professional training of more than
1500 policymakers in emerging markets, I employ a two-stage modeling approach
to assess the relative and independent impact of neoliberal economists on capital
account policy+ The first-stage model explores the factors driving appointments+
Here I find that both credibility concerns and political interests matter+ Yet I also
stress that a fuller understanding of the appointment process necessitates a focus
on the social environment in which appointments are situated+ Official and market
sentiment is likely to have conditioned how some politicians interpreted their pol-
icy options; and economists, who helped to create this sentiment, in turn exploited
it to secure appointments and promote their views+
Instruments to control for the nonrandom selection of economists are then devel-
oped and incorporated in the second-stage model exploring policy decisions+ The
findings indicate that formation of a coherent policymaking team of neoliberal
economists significantly influenced the decision to liberalize+ The findings sug-
gest existing explanations are incomplete, as they neglect one of their crucial
complements: the role of neoliberal ideas+ By examining and demonstrating the
role of economists in promoting these ideas, this analysis helps one better
understand the process of liberalization in emerging markets+ The results also
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contribute to one’s understanding of policy diffusion, suggesting that economists
are an important, though often overlooked, conduit through which ideas and pol-
icy practices spread+
Epistemic Communities and Policy Reform
The recent literature on policy reforms in emerging markets often features mem-
bers of an epistemic community of neoliberal economists as key players+9 These
accounts suggest that professional training of economists serves as a form of social-
ization that shapes their subsequent policy preferences and drives the diffusion of
policy practices+ Professional training in economics shapes an individual’s prefer-
ences by promoting, both implicitly and explicitly, a particular set of causal and
normative beliefs+10 The technical knowledge and normative beliefs imparted
through professional training subsequently becomes an interpretative lens through
which economists diagnose problems and identify solutions+
Material trends, such as capital mobility, do not come with an “instruction sheet+”
Rather, they need to be interpreted and policy responses debated and negotiated+
Economists thus become critical policymaking actors and help to diffuse policy
practices when they insert their interpretations into the decision-making process
through persuasion and negotiation+ These interpretations in turn give meaning to
material trends and legitimate specific policy options+ By defining what policy
choices are possible, these interpretations can shape the interests and behavior of
politicians+
Some suggest the appointment process is driven by uncertainty+11 In situations
of uncertainty, politicians are unable to deduce their preferences and understand-
ings of options from contemporary circumstances and thus turn to the inter-
pretations economists provide+ The process driving the turn to expertise may be
“rationalist” or “constructivist” in that politicians may delegate authority to econ-
omists due to their informational advantage or because economists’ credentials
constitute them as authoritative sources of information+12
Others propose alternative models of the appointment process, focusing on the
incentives driving the turn to expertise+ One such model—which I label the cred-
ibility model—claims that politicians appoint neoliberal economists as a signal to
official and private creditors of a government’s creditworthiness as well as the
credibility of its commitment to a particular policy orientation+13 Due to their sim-
ilar professional training, neoliberal economists and external financial representa-
tives often share common policy orientations and speak the same language ~both
9+ See Babb 2001; and Dominguez 1997+
10+ See, for instance, Klamer and Colander 1990+
11+ Haas 1992+
12+ See Krehbiel 1991; and Barnett and Finnemore 2004+
13+ Maxfield 1997+
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professionally and linguistically!, thus politicians may appoint economists to
enhance their credibility and serve as their interlocutors with creditors+14 Alterna-
tively, the political interests of politicians might also drive appointment deci-
sions+15 In this political model of the appointment process, politicians appoint
economists whose interpretations resonate with their own beliefs and0or are likely
to further their political careers+
Yet the epistemic community literature fails to specify the conditions that facil-
itate the implementation of expert interpretations into policy+ Here the formation
of a coherent policymaking team, characterized by a preponderance of like-minded
experts in key bureaucratic positions, is likely to prove critical+ To implement their
ideas into policy after their appointment, economists must persuade and negotiate
with other policymakers, and at the same time resist opposing societal demands+
A coherent policymaking team is likely to be in a stronger position to accomplish
these goals than a heterogeneous team+
In the absence of competing ideas to guide policy, coherence ensures consistent
advice and increases the likelihood that the chief of government and other politi-
cians will view the interpretations these economists offer as “correct+” 16 In con-
trast to coherent policymaking teams, heterogeneous policymaking teams afford
chiefs of government the opportunity to rely on those ideas that are already com-
patible with their own and can be used to legitimate their preexisting policy pref-
erences or enhance their domestic power base+ Coherence also increases the
insulation of policymakers from societal demands by shielding the decision-
making process from alternative views+17
Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account
Liberalization
These arguments can be extended to offer a new theory of capital account liberal-
ization+ Considerable uncertainty surrounds the decision to liberalize the capital
account+ Numerous econometric studies have generally concluded that liberaliza-
tion fails to offer unambiguous benefits and is often associated with financial cri-
sis+18 In addition to this policy-specific uncertainty, many politicians in emerging
markets are often faced with context-specific uncertainty induced by economic
crisis+ Faced with these forms of uncertainty, politicians turn to economists to pro-
vide interpretations to diagnose the situation and to specify what policy choice is
appropriate+ I thus assume politicians are faced with uncertainty and focus on the
processes through which this uncertainty is translated into policy outcomes+
14+ See Markoff and Montecinos 1993; and Babb 2001+
15+ Geddes 1994+
16+ Checkel 2001+
17+ Hall 1989+
18+ For a review of the literature, see Eichengreen 2001+
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As noted, the interpretations economists provide tend to be linked to the sub-
stance of their professional training+ This suggests that professional training in
academic departments associated with favorable interpretations of free capital
movements—a set of beliefs commonly referred to as neoliberalism—probably
instilled in some economists a belief that liberalization is beneficial and desirable+
After forming a coherent policy team, these economists should serve as a critical
conduit for the diffusion of neoliberal ideas and policy practices and thus increase
the likelihood of liberalization+
In the early 1960s most economists in the profession abandoned the Keynesian
claim—which had dominated thinking since World War II—that the volatility of
financial markets necessitated and legitimated the permanent use of capital con-
trols+19 Replacing the Keynesian consensus was a new set of what might be called
neoclassical understandings that came to dominate the profession and formed the
basis for neoliberalism+20 In contrast to Keynesians, neoclassical economists shared
the view that unfettered capital mobility would be beneficial and desirable, at least
in the long run+ Although some neoclassical economists recognized the dangers of
rapid liberalization and the importance of sequencing and that international capi-
tal markets could err in the short run, as Tirole observes, “A wide consensus had
emerged among economists, @that# capital account liberalization—allowing capi-
tal to move freely in and out of countries without restrictions—was unambigu-
ously good+” 21
The differences that remained among neoclassical economists were one of degree
rather than kind+ Debates persisted within the profession about the importance of
the pace and sequencing of liberalization, but not of its long-run desirability+ This
consensus was in sharp contrast to Keynesian understandings that denied the desir-
ability of liberalization even in the long run+ Remarkably, this neoliberal consensus
developed in the absence of unambiguous evidence confirming the benefits of lib-
eralization and persisted until the Asian financial crisis+ One key attribute that con-
stitutes being a neoliberal then is shared knowledge about the long-run beneficial
impact and desirability of liberalizing capital controls+Using Munck and Verkuilen’s
terminology, this attribute is one of the “leaves” of the concept tree of neoliberal-
ism, and it is only the impact of this specific conceptual leaf that I seek to address+22
It is also important to recognize how this consensus facilitated liberalization
not only directly ~by shaping the views of economists! but also indirectly by shap-
ing the social environment in which appointments were situated+ The logic of the
credibility model depends on the beliefs or sentiment shared by members of the
19+ Best 2005, chap+ 5+ Chwieroth 2007b provides a fuller treatment of the evolution of the eco-
nomic profession’s ideas about capital controls+
20+ For a summary of these understandings, see Obstfeld 1998+
21+ Tirole 2002, ix+ Even Williamson—who routinely stressed the dangers of liberalization—
subtitled one of his warnings “Liberalize the Capital Account Last,” not “Liberalize the Capital Account
Never” as Keynes suggested; see Williamson 1997+
22+ Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 13+
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official and private financial community, such as the U+S+ Treasury, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund ~IMF!, commercial banks, private investors, and credit
rating agencies+ Credibility model arguments are premised on the assumption that
a neoliberal consensus characterizes the beliefs and types of policies these actors
deem possible and legitimate+ This consensus privileges the appointment of neo-
liberal economists and their preferred policies as the sole credible policy alterna-
tive+ “In the absence of @this# ideational consensus,” as Simmons and Elkins observe,
“heterodox policies are difficult to distinguish and readily tolerated+” 23 Delega-
tion to neoliberal economists is thus a rational strategy but only within a particu-
lar social environment that rewards such appointments+
Although based on the data employed in the analysis I cannot directly assess
the influence of this social environment, there is compelling evidence to suspect it
was influential in precluding alternative strategies+24 For instance, some econo-
mists proposed the use of capital controls and other regulatory solutions as an
alternative strategy to deal with the 1980s debt crisis+25 Yet little came of these
proposals+ U+S+ policymakers, the IMF, and the private financial community argued
that the better solution was not regulatory but, rather, one involving the implemen-
tation of anti-inflationary and liberalizing policies+26
This neoliberal sentiment acted as a severe constraint on the types of policy
options that emerging market politicians perceived to be sustainable+ As Haggard
and Kaufman note, this sentiment “conditioned the way elites interpreted the eco-
nomic crises of the 1980s and the kinds of policy options @and thus appointments#
necessary to remedy them+” 27 Given this sentiment, the appointment of structur-
alist economists and the use of capital controls were no longer perceived as viable
strategies+ Yet before the rise of this sentiment, such strategies did not signal her-
esy or necessarily either result in significant reputational costs or undermine cred-
ibility+ On the contrary, such actions were part of economic orthodoxy and hence
tolerated and widely employed+28
The appointment process therefore does not take place in a social vacuum+ Before
making an appointment, politicians often engage a variety of experts to solicit
their views about the appropriate policy course+ Yet neoliberal economists are not
passive actors in the appointment process+ Rather, they have proven to be quite
adept at exploiting official and market sentiment to secure government appoint-
ments and to promote their views, earning the label “technopols” to indicate their
hybrid status as technocrats and politicians+
23+ Simmons and Elkins 2004, 173+
24+ To conduct such an analysis would require a time-series that extends to appointments prior to
the ascendance of neoliberal official and market sentiment, which is currently unavailable+
25+ See, for instance, Diaz-Alejandro 1984+
26+ Helleiner 1994, 181–82+ See also Widmaier 2003+
27+ Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 22–23; see also 36–37+
28+ Helleiner 1994+
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These technopols recognize prevailing official and market sentiment as well as
the corresponding incentives politicians face and often deliberately frame their pol-
icy recommendations so that they resonate with these incentives+29 As former IMF
First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer notes, neoliberal economists in
emerging markets often use official sentiment to secure and to promote their posi-
tion, using negotiations and discussions with the IMF to strengthen their views
against their domestic opponents+30 Despite the ambiguous empirical basis for cap-
ital account liberalization in emerging markets, neoliberal economists also often
present their recommendations as the only “credible” policy available to appease
market sentiment+ With the ascendance of neoliberal ideas in official and market
sentiment, it is then not surprising that more interventionist approaches were per-
ceived as lacking credibility+
Capital account liberalization in emerging markets is thus likely to be linked to
the diffusion of ideas via neoliberal economists+ These lines of argument lead to
the empirical expectation that liberalization is likely to be associated with the pres-
ence of a neoliberal economist as chief of government as well as the formation of
a coherent policymaking team of neoliberal economists+
Testing the Hypotheses
Data
The sample is composed of annual data from twenty-nine emerging market econ-
omies from 1977 to 1999+31 The specific countries and time frame for study were
determined by data availability+ Summary statistics and data sources are provided
in the Appendix+ All economic variables are specified as five-year moving aver-
ages to offer a more robust set of prior economic conditions+32
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is an index of capital account open-
ness, developed by Chinn and Ito, which indicates the intensity of capital controls
across countries+33 Higher values of the index represent greater openness+
Independent variable: An indicator of a neoliberal economist. To create an
indicator of a neoliberal economist, I focus on the importance of professional train-
ing and rely on an approach I develop elsewhere+34 This approach shows that an
29+ See Dominguez 1997; and Babb 2001+
30+ Fischer 1997, 26+
31+ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salva-
dor, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Par-
aguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela+
32+ The use of various lag structures or levels does not significantly alter the results+
33+ Chinn and Ito 2002+
34+ Chwieroth 2007a+
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individual’s professional training background can serve as a useful proxy for the
ideas that individual shares+As noted, in the economics profession the leading pro-
ponents of liberalization are associated with neoclassical economics+ On the basis
of earlier qualitative studies of academic departments and publication frequency
in the American Economic Review, a list of neoclassical economics departments
that were likely promoters of neoliberal ideas was identified+35 These departments
are used as a proxy for the neoliberal ideas that individuals share as a result of their
similar training+ The assumptions that training at one of these departments proba-
bly leads individuals trained there to be socialized to adopt neoliberal ideas+36
The earlier theoretical discussion suggests that the key individuals in question
are the chief of government and the staff of the national financial and monetary
bureaucratic agencies+ Ideally, one would examine the entire decision-making tree
of these agencies in each country and code the professional training of these indi-
viduals+ This approach is not feasible, however, as the type of information needed
is not available+ Alternatively, one can focus on the high-ranking financial and
monetary policymakers in each state—the finance minister and the head of the
central bank—and code their training+ Since these data are available from 1977 to
1999, that is the approach I adopt+ The data on educational background were found
in Proquest’s Digital Dissertations database+Approximately 15 percent of the sam-
ple ~233 out of 1,549 individuals! was scored as trained in economics at a “neo-
classical academic department+”
Aggregating the scores for the finance minister and head of the central bank
~where 1  trained at “neoclassical academic department,” 0  otherwise! pro-
duces the variable labeled neoliberal team+ This variable ranges from 0 to 2, with
higher values indicating more neoliberals and greater coherence+ Consistent with
the earlier theoretical discussion, I expect this variable to be positively associated
with liberalization+ To account for the beliefs of the chief of government, I also
construct a similar measure for that position+ I also expect this variable to be pos-
itively associated with liberalization+
Control variables. A standard set of control variables from the literature is
included in the analysis+ I rely on annual global foreign borrowing measured in
$US billion as a proxy for the constraints from capital mobility+ I also examine
the possibility that capital account policy decisions are employed as signals to
enhance the credibility of a government in the eyes of international financial
35+ University of California at Berkeley, Brown, Carnegie Mellon, Chicago, Harvard, Hebrew Uni-
versity ~Israel!, Johns Hopkins, New York University, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Stan-
ford, Wisconsin, and Yale+
36+ It is also possible that individuals trained in other leading U+S+ economic departments during
this time found themselves exposed to ideas about liberalization+ However, the conviction these other
departments held toward neoclassical understandings was not likely to be as strong as in the depart-
ments identified+ Moreover, in statistical analyses in which “U+S+-educated” or “Anglo-American edu-
cated” is employed the effect is found to be insignificant+ This suggests the importance of professional
training in specific academic departments+
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markets+37 Governments in need of international creditworthiness may liberalize
to ~re!gain the confidence of international financial markets+ Following Maxfield,
I employ three indicators to capture a government’s need for international credit-
worthiness: average annual interest rate on private credit minus the Eurodollar or
London interbank offer rate ~libor!, debt service as a proportion of exports,
and international reserves as a proportion of imports+38 Comparatively higher
interest rates and debt service ratios and lower levels of reserves are likely to indi-
cate increased need for creditworthiness and enhance the likelihood that govern-
ments will liberalize capital controls as a signal+
To proxy the influence of interest groups presumably favoring liberalization, I
rely on trade integration as a proportion of gross domestic product ~GDP! and
domestic money bank assets as a proportion of GDP+ Variables indicating the pres-
ence of a leftist and rightist government ~where 1  presence, 0  otherwise! are
also included in the model+A measure of central bank independence ~cbi!—which
is traditionally measured in developing countries based on the average turnover of
central bank governors—is also included+ I also include a variable indicating the
level of democracy+
To provide a proxy for the influence of policy diffusion, I use the mean capital
account policy of all emerging markets with the logic being that policymakers are
sensitive to policies similar states adopt+39 Policies might also diffuse through active
pressures emanating from external actors+ I therefore include in the analysis a num-
ber of variables associated with American influence in emerging markets: trade with
the United States as a proportion of GDP, and two separate dichotomous variables
indicating whether a given country entered into a bilateral investment treaty
~bit!with the United States or an imf program ~where 1 presence, 0 otherwise!+
I also control for economic variables that are commonly featured in the litera-
ture: the presence of a fixed exchange rate, gdp per capita, and gross domes-
tic savings as proportion of GDP+40 Finally, I also include variables measuring
the influence of economic shocks on policy+ Currency crises may be a reason for a
government to impose restrictions or an impetus for reform+ A measure indicating
the presence of a currency crisis ~where 1  presence, 0  otherwise! is thus
included in the analysis+ Another type of shock is variation in world interest rates,
which could cause capital outflows, balance of payments problems, and exchange
rate pressure, with accompanying pressures on policymakers+ u.s. interest rates
are used as a proxy for world interest rates to control for this possibility+
37+ Bartolini and Drazen 1997+
38+ Maxfield 1997+
39+ See Simmons and Elkins 2004+
40+ For a review of the literature, see Eichengreen 2001+ I also analyzed variables associated with
the transitional costs of liberalization—such as the strength of a country’s financial sector and its com-
pensation capacity—but these specifications returned statistically insignificant results and they were
dropped from the model+ All model specification tests used the Bayesian information criterion+ For a
discussion of model selection criteria, see Beck and Katz 2004+
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Methods
This article relies on time-series cross-sectional ~TSCS! data+ With these data one
must be concerned with issues of heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correla-
tion, temporal dependence, and unmeasured heterogeneity+ Several diagnostic mea-
sures are used to mitigate these problems and the results are subjected to sensitivity
analysis+
The analysis proceeds in two stages+ In the first stage, I specify separate selec-
tion equations for the finance minister and central banker to assess whether the
appointment of a neoliberal economist is not random+ In the second stage, I then
employ the procedures Heckman advocates to calculate the inverse Mills ratio from
each selection equation to serve as instruments controlling for nonrandom selec-
tion in the outcome equation+
The credibility model suggests that politicians are more likely to appoint a neo-
liberal economist when they face a need for international creditworthiness+As prox-
ies for this need I again use average annual interest rate on private credit minus
the Eurodollar or libor, debt service as a proportion of exports, and international
reserves as a proportion of imports+ I also include the presence of an imf pro-
gram to test the extent to which politicians feel obliged to appoint neoliberals to
serve as their interlocutors with official creditors+ To test for processes associated
with the political model, I include measures of government partisanship and the
presence of a neoliberal chief of government+ I also assess the effect of cbi,
as an independent central bank may reflect domestic norms favoring free markets
and thus low average turnover might increase the likelihood of a neoliberal appoint-
ment+ Alternatively, international financial markets may interpret a legacy of high
average turnover as indicating a lack of policy credibility, thus leading to the
appointment of a neoliberal economist to enhance credibility+ Political constraints
may also shape appointment decisions, as veto players opposed to the government
may be able to influence the composition of the policymaking team+ In this view,
greater opposition might decrease the likelihood a neoliberal is appointed+ A mea-
sure of the number of veto players and their degree of opposition to the govern-
ment ~checks! is therefore included in the analysis+41
Finally, I also include two economic variables: inflation as measured by
the natural log of the GDP deflator and the presence of currency crisis+
Each of these variables might enhance the “economic viability” of neoliberal-
ism+42 Neoliberalism—which prioritizes price stability—addresses the problem of
inflation+43 Crises are also likely to shape appointment strategies, as they not only
41+ Keefer and Stasavage 2003+
42+ On an idea’s economic viability, see Hall 1989+
43+ I also experimented with models that controlled for each of the political and economic control
variables identified earlier+ Using decade dummies to account for important differences in the world
economy over the course of time, I also estimated models taking into account time effects+ None of
these specifications returned statistically significant results, and they were dropped from the model+
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heighten concerns about creditworthiness and credibility, but also induce uncer-
tainty and provide an opportunity for neoliberals operating outside the policymak-
ing process an opportunity to promote their ideas and secure appointments+
Since the focus of the first stage of the analysis is on the occurrence ~or appoint-
ment! of a neoliberal economist—an event that may occur more than once—an
event history model that addresses the issue of repeated events is appropriate+44
The dominant approach to repeated-event data is to use a variance-correction model+
Within this class of models, the most suitable method for these data is the condi-
tional elapsed time variant, as it is capable of addressing the issue that appoint-
ments develop sequentially as well as the possibility that the timing of an
appointment is different across occurrences, thus allowing for country experi-
ences with neoliberal economists at time t-1, such as strong or poor economic
performance, to shape the likelihood of an appointment at time t+
To deal with the issue of possible unmeasured heterogeneity, I include fixed
effects+ I also include a lagged dependent variable ~LDV! to account for temporal
dependence+ However, a complication arises in that inclusion of a LDV and fixed
effects in the same model can produce biased and inconsistent estimates+ Given
that such a specification is biased, many alternatives have been proposed+ Yet these
alternatives tend to be more suitable for panel as opposed to TSCS data+ More-
over, the bias is often negligible in TSCS data when a long time series can miti-
gate against it+ Indeed, recent evidence from Monte Carlo simulations suggests
that such a specification outperforms alternatives+45 I thus proceed with the analy-
sis using this specification and subject it to sensitivity analysis using two different
types of standard errors recommended in the literature: panel-corrected standard
errors and robust standards+ The results from these specifications are presented in
the first and second column of Table 2+
Empirical Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports the Cox proportional hazard ratios from the selection equation+46
While the results suggest that appointments for both positions tend to be driven
by factors associated with the political model, the credibility model only receives
support for finance minister appointments+ One explanation for this finding may
be that politicians perceive the rules and norms governing central bank operations
to matter more to official and market sentiment than do appointment decisions in
terms of enhancing credibility+
44+ Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 157– 66+
45+ See Beck and Katz 2004; and Kristensen and Wawro 2006+
46+ Hazard ratios can be understood as the change in the odds of an event associated with a one-
unit change in the explanatory variable+ Therefore, hazard ratios greater than 1 represent an increased
probability of an event; of 0 to 1, a decreased probability of an event; and of 1, zero effect+
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Support for the credibility model is found in column 1+ The results indicate that
a one-unit increase in the average central bank turnover renders a politician 2+68
times more likely to appoint a neoliberal economist as finance minister+ This find-
ing suggests that politicians faced with neoliberal official and market sentiment
may view the appointment of a neoliberal finance minister as offering a substitute
for the credibility-enhancing effects that an independent central bank can offer+ A
legacy of high average central bank turnover may lead politicians to perceive the
appointment of a neoliberal finance minister as an easier route to gaining credibil-
ity than seeking to push through reforms to strengthen central bank independence+
Moreover, a legacy of high average turnover rates can also account for the insig-
nificant coefficient for CBI in column 2+ This legacy may lead politicians to have
little confidence that the central bank governor—neoliberal or otherwise—will be
able to stay the course of politically unpopular policies+
There is also some support for the political model+ Domestic opposition in
the form of veto players lessens the likelihood of appointing a neoliberal finance
TABLE 1. Covariates of neoliberal appointments, 1977–99
Eurodollar/
Finance minister
Central banker
average private interest rate +930 +938
~eurodollar/libor! ~+054! ~+117!
debt service/exports +996 1+01
~+006! ~+009!
reserves/imports +998 1+01
~+026! ~+049!
imf program 1+07 1+04
~+123! ~+138!
leftist government 1+32 1+42
~+292! ~+647!
rightist government +864 1+27
~+125! ~+218!
neoliberal chief of government 1+40 1+75*
~+452! ~+472!
cbi 2+68** 1+32
~+997! ~+682!
checks +847** +939
~+052! ~+034!
ln inflation 1+02 +799
~+079! ~+098!
currency crisis +535 +901
~+178! ~+192!
Time at risk 636 636
Number of subjects 636 636
Number of failures 95 105
Log likelihood 97+05 135+94
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
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minister+47 Additional support for the political model is provided by the finding
that a neoliberal chief of government 1+75 times more likely to appoint a neolib-
eral central banker, suggesting that similar professional training facilitates a high
degree of resonance+
Table 2 contains the estimates from the models explaining policy decisions+ Note-
worthy first are the statistically insignificant selection instruments, indicating that
nonrandom selection does not introduce bias+48 Across both model specifications
neoliberal economists are found to have a pronounced effect on capital account pol-
icy+ Even when the possibility of nonrandom selection is taken into account, the
coefficient measuring the influence of a neoliberal policymaking team is signed as
expected and significant+ This finding strongly suggests that neoliberal economists
matter for policy choices independent of the processes leading to their appointment+
Coherence also appears important+ Independent of the processes leading to their
appointment, the coefficients from both models indicate that one additional neo-
liberal economist in the policymaking team increases capital account openness on
the index by +129+ To put it differently, one additional neoliberal economist, and
hence greater coherence, can be said to decrease the intensity of capital controls
by anywhere from 4 to 5 percent+ A government with a neoliberal economist serv-
ing as finance minister and head of the central bank is thus likely to be approxi-
mately 10 percent more liberal in terms of capital account openness when compared
to a government without any neoliberal economists+
Interestingly, the coefficient for neoliberal chief of government is insignificant,
suggesting that not everyone’s ideas matter equally+ Domestic political constraints
may help account for this finding+As stated, even if a neoliberal economist becomes
chief of government he or she still must often confront various political con-
straints, such as a coalition government, legislative pressures, or opposing societal
groups+ Whereas a coherent policymaking team helps militate against these con-
straints, the evidence suggests a neoliberal chief of government cannot overcome
these constraints alone and probably often has his or her policy preferences blocked+
Turning to the control variables, increased levels of global foreign borrowing
and comparatively higher levels of interest rates are found to significantly increase
the likelihood of liberalization+ These findings suggest that capital mobility and
credibility concerns were probably influential+ Yet, it is important to recall that
these material trends are socially mediated+ Earlier I suggested how the neoliberal
consensus may have shaped politicians’ perceptions of what constituted a “credi-
ble” course of action in the face of declining creditworthiness+ In addition, this
result could also reflect efforts of neoliberal economists to frame their proposals
as the only “credible” policy option given these material conditions+ In Argentina
47+ Additional analysis revealed that this result was not contingent on partisanship or the presence
of a neoliberal chief of government+ Results are available from the author on request+
48+ Even though specifications without the selection instruments reveal little change in the magni-
tude or significance of the coefficients, diagnostic tests indicate that the selection instruments should
remain in the model+
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TABLE 2. Covariates of capital account policy, 1977–99
(1) (2)
neoliberal team +129* +129*
~+059! ~+063!
neoliberal chief of government +129 +129
~+228! ~+193!
international borrowing +0008* +0008
~+0004! ~+0005!
average private interest rate (libor) +066* +066*
~+029! ~+033!
debt service/exports +005 +005
~+007! ~+005!
reserves/imports +027 +027
~+014! ~+023!
trade/gdp +0009 +0009
~+004! ~+004!
domestic money bank assets/gdp +008* +008*
~+004! ~+003!
leftist government +222 +222
~+153! ~+176!
rightist government +057 +057
~+112! ~+123!
central bank independence (cbi) +268 +268
~+207! ~+219!
democracy +009 +009
~+009! ~+009!
mean capital account policy +197 +197
~+247! ~+303!
u.s. trade/gdp 1+39 1+39
~+899! ~1+08!
u.s. bilateral investment treaty (bit) +209 +209
~+117! ~+194!
imf program +142* +142*
~+065! ~+065!
fixed exchange rate +057 +057
~+079! ~+096!
gdp per capita +011 +011
~+012! ~+013!
gross domestic savings/gdp +014 +014
~+007! ~+009!
currency crisis +068 +068
~+102! ~+100!
u.s. interest rates +021 +021
~+021! ~+022!
finance minster selection instrument +144 +144
~+236! ~+217!
central banker selection instrument +242 +242
~+383! ~+352!
Constant +661 +661
~1+19! ~+62!
N 448 448
R-squared +871 +809
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses+ Robust standard errors are in
parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
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in the 1990s, for instance, perceptions and framing were likely to have been at
work in President Carlos Menem’s decision to support Harvard-educated Dom-
ingo Cavallo’s recommendations for liberalization+49
The neoliberal consensus may also have shaped politicians’ perceptions about
the effectiveness of capital controls+ A familiar refrain of the neoliberal consensus
was that capital controls did not “work” in the context of capital mobility+ Yet
before the Asian crisis researchers paid little attention to exploring precisely how
they did not work+ Initial analyses found that controls were ineffective in reducing
the volume of capital flows or in helping to manage exchange rate pressures+ But
few examined their effectiveness beyond these objectives+ Some politicians faced
with rising capital mobility thus might have liberalized, perceiving the alterna-
tives as unsustainable+ Indeed, even those who emphasize the role of capital mobil-
ity recognize how “widely shared ideological commitments” and “mind sets”
mediated this material trend in such a manner that it facilitated liberalization+50 It
was only after the Asian crisis shattered the neoliberal consensus that researchers
began to focus on how controls might help achieve other objectives, such as length-
ening the maturity structure of inflows or offering a temporary “breathing space”
to implement reforms in the face of outflows+51 Now the consensus has shifted
and many policymakers and academics recognize that controls can play a useful
purpose+
The IMF program variable is also found to significantly increase the likelihood
of liberalization+ Though the IMF never included liberalization as a condition for
access to its resources and did not promote such a policy choice indiscriminately,
there is evidence the IMF staff did encourage it in some countries and the pres-
ence of an IMF program would offer a channel through which these views could
be made known+52 Negotiations over IMF programs also offered an avenue through
which U+S+ policymakers could promote their views on liberalization+53
Contradicting the expectations of interest group approaches, the coefficient mea-
suring the strength of domestic financial intermediaries is negative and signifi-
cant+As suggested, this finding is likely because of the uncertainty this group faces
about the material benefits and risks that liberalization can bring+ Revealingly, partly
because of concerns about this uncertainty from financial intermediaries in emerg-
ing markets, the Institute of International Finance—the organization located in
Washington, D+C+, that represents the interests of the private financial community—
came down cautiously rather than enthusiastically in its support for capital account
liberalization+54 This suggests an additional reason why the examination of how
49+ See Stokes 2001; and Corrales 1997+
50+ Andrews 1994, 200–201+
51+ See the summary provided in IMF 2005, 18, 46, 75–76+
52+ IMF 2005+
53+ Kirshner 2003+
54+ Interview by the author with Charles H+ Dallara, managing director of the Institute of Inter-
national Finance ~1993–present!, 24 May 2005, Washington, D+C+; and IIF 1997, 2– 4, 11, 13+
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politicians and policymakers understand their interests, independent of interest
groups, proves useful+
Conclusions
Detailed case evidence has supported the claim that the role of neoliberal econo-
mists is crucial to understanding policy reform+ Yet this research has generally
failed to assess the relative and independent effect of these economists+ Control-
ling for conventional explanations and accounting for nonrandom selection, I have
demonstrated in this study the relative and independent impact of neoliberal econ-
omists on capital account policy in emerging markets+ I have also shown that the
appointment process of these economists is likely to be driven by credibility con-
cerns and political interests, which in turn are conditioned by the social environ-
ment in which appointments are situated+
This study, however, is not without limitations+ While the methods employed
are ideally suited for examining the independent effect of neoliberal economists,
they are less amenable to answering questions as to how they mattered+ Such an
examination, however, is beyond the scope of this article+ Here, the rich evidence
case studies can provide in tracing these processes should prove quite useful in
sorting out the relative importance of persuasion, negotiation, political and eco-
nomic incentives, and the role of official and market sentiment+
Despite these limitations, the findings are robust and hold two important impli-
cations+ First, the results suggest that existing explanations of capital account lib-
eralization are incomplete+ Even taken together current explanations cannot fully
account for the wave of liberalization, as they neglect the complementary role of
ideas+ The results are highly suggestive that neoliberal economists—who have yet
to receive systematic attention in the literature—were critical in shaping capital
account policy decisions in emerging markets+ By addressing and demonstrating
the role of these economists, this article offers a fuller understanding of liberaliza-
tion in emerging markets+
Second, the results suggest the conclusion that economists are an important con-
duit through which ideas diffuse and are implemented into policy+ Much previous
research has employed case studies and anecdotal evidence to conclude that neo-
classically trained economists are an important mechanism for policy diffusion+
Yet these conclusions have not been systematically tested and have been for the
most part neglected by the recent wave of diffusion research+55 By contrast, this
article provides evidence suggesting that neoliberal economists are probably an
important route through which ideas and policies are diffused, indicating that this
diffusion mechanism should be a high priority for future research+
55+ See, for instance, Simmons, Garrett, and Dobbin 2006+
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Appendix
TABLE A1. Summary statistics
Variable N Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
capital account openness 775 +2892 1+361 1+7926 2+6566
neoliberal team 782 +2966 +5957 0 2
neoliberal chief of government 782 +0230 +1500 0 1
international borrowing 714 402+92 308+97 68+95 1224+75
average private interest rate (libor) 644 +3494 2+528 10 9+8
debt service/exports 688 24+67 14+30 1+038 117+81
reserves/imports 774 3+971 2+507 +2261 15+02
trade/gdp 759 55+45 29+22 6+32 217+6
domestic money bank assets/gdp 743 33+91 24+59 2+54 125+7
leftist government 779 +1720 +3776 0 1
rightist government 779 +3517 +4778 0 1
cbi 782 +3481 +2523 0 1+3
democracy 782 2+354 6+429 10 10
mean capital account policy 782 +2671 +3773 +6547 +5516
u.s. trade/gdp 782 14+18 13+14 +6531 94+72
u.s. bit 782 +0511 +2204 0 1
imf program 782 +4706 +4994 0 1
fixed exchange rate 759 +3847 +4868 0 1
gdp per capita 782 30+14 37+69 2+164 262+94
gross domestic savings/gdp 782 18+99 10+18 20+49 53+35
currency crisis 782 +1931 +3949 0 1
u.s. interest rates 782 6+761 2+737 3 13
ln inflation 750 2+724 1+305 3+091 9+420
TABLE A2. Data sources
Variable Source
foreign borrowing OECD various years+
average private interest rate
(eurodollar/libor)
World Bank 2006a; British Bankers’ Association
2006; and Maxfield 1997+
debt service/exports, reserves/imports,
trade/gdp, gdp per capita, gross domestic
savings/gdp, inflation
World Bank 2006b+
domestic money bank assets/gdp Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2000+
leftist & rightist government, checks Beck et al+ 2001+
cbi Cukierman 1992; and de Haan and Kooi 2000+
democracy Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2004+
u.s. trade/gdp IMF 2006a+
u.s. bit U+S+ Department of State 2006+
imf program Vreeland 2003+
fixed exchange rate IMF various years+
currency crisis Leblang 2004+
u.s. interest rates IMF 2006b
Note: Excludes those sources discussed in text+
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